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THESIS

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE FUTURE

by

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June 2010

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**ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PROFESSIONAL
MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE FUTURE**

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requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

One way to educate United States Army Special Operators is by allowing organizational design and individual competencies to form the nucleus of a professional military education curriculum routinely evaluated against assessment variables such as the emerging strategic context, the requests of Theater Special Operations Commands or other customer units, and the feedback of deployed operators and teams. This thesis recommends an Army Special Operations Command-focused educational development process applicable to the career-long education and utilization of Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations professionals. To make these recommendations, the thesis considers why the organizational structure of the Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) should differ from that of their General Purpose Forces counterparts and identifies the expected ARSOF mission set for the next twenty years as well as the professional competencies required to execute this expected mission set. It then offers a series of suggestions for how the recommended changes could be implemented.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ALDS	A Leader Development Strategy
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
C4ISR	Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CA	Civil Affairs
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Corps
CNA	Computer Network Attack
CND	Computer Network Defense
CP	Counterproliferation
CT	Counterterrorism
DA	Defense Analysis
DA	Direct Action
EW	Electronic Warfare
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GPF	General Purpose Forces
HN	Host Nation
IO	Information Operations
JFCC-NW	Joint Force Component Command-Network Warfare
JI	Jemaah Islamash
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational
JIOWC	Joint Information Operations Warfare Center
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF-GNO	Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations
MILDEC	Military Deception
MIST	Military Information Support Team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU	National Defense University
NLF	National Liberation Front
NMS	National Military Strategy

NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSA	National Security Agency
OCPW	Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PME	Professional military education
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SORB	Special Operations Recruiting Battalion
SR	Special Reconnaissance
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VC	Viet Cong
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

I.   PREFACE

The least well-known professionals employed by the United States Army are the men and women who form the inimitable cadre of warriors and academicians who spend their days thinking about professional military education (PME) for the United States Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). This thesis draws on much of their work in an attempt to foment professional debate about the future of ARSOF as an adaptable learning institution. Unlike the majority of academic thought papers that analyze and present data in a dry and mechanistic fashion, this thesis presents several ideas for consideration utilizing the literary medium of fiction. The characters used to convey the ideas herein are figments of the author's imagination. However, their duty positions are existent and, in the real world, are filled by dedicated United States Army officers and non-commissioned officers; any relationship to any actual former or future special operator is purely unintentional.

What you take away from the following pages will depend on your desire to infer practical concepts from the nascent thoughts presented to you by members of the United States Army Special Operations Command PME working group that, while it does not exist in reality, you will nonetheless find hard at work in the pages to follow.

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II. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (ARSOF)

The principal goal of education is to create men who are capable of doing new things, not simply of repeating what other generations have done.

Jean Piaget (1896–1980) Swiss cognitive psychologist

CG: Hey DCO, you're never going to believe this; come in here and shut the door.

DCO: What's going on sir?

CG: The General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) are both on the same page at the same time. Look at these documents:

> We find compelling evidence that the U.S. Army's officer Corps will be unequal to future demands unless substantive management changes are made. Perhaps the most obvious risk indicator is the Army's persistent and substantial gap in mid-career officers.[1]

Ok, so that's what the Strategic Studies Institute is putting out. Now, take a look at this excerpt from the 2010 SOCOM strategy that was just published:

> The Operator is the platform upon which all other systems must orient . . . This operator is the building block and foundation of teams and units encompassing USSOF specialists including intelligence, logistics, and communications, as well as other essential functions. . . . In order to realize the vision, the right collection of operational, technical, and intellectual capabilities, capacities, and authorities are essential to enable the Operator to execute potential mission sets across the core activities.[2]

What's your take DCO?

---

[1] Wardynski et al., *Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), v.

[2] United States Special Operations Command, *U.S. Special Operations Command Strategy 2010* (Tampa, 2009), 1.

DCO: Sir, I think we are going to see professional military education (PME) become the hot topic for the next few years. I also think that this is something we should weigh in on early so we can shape the Army's point of view because the GPF provide a large portion of the PME ARSOF officers receive.

CG: Why don't you form a small working group to conduct a literature survey, see what the prevailing thoughts on ARSOF PME currently are, and send me your findings? Your primary task is to determine if our way of doing business requires any change in order to better resource our people. I am very interested to see if we need to make any changes to the way our people are educated and, if so, what changes you recommend. I want you to consider the capacity of our people to operate effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict, from conducting direct action missions through supporting humanitarian operations, to performing support and stability operations in conjunction with non-military and non-governmental organizations. I am not convinced that it is humanly possible for us to develop and manage a pool of ARSOF talent that can adequately execute our entire mission set all the time. That said, make sure you look at our current core missions and see if they will still be relevant as ARSOF missions in the future. I also want you to look at the educational competencies required by the ARSOF mission set and see what you think about creating specialists versus generalists within ARSOF. Review the ARSOF training and development model and see if it needs amending to better educate our people to get the job done.

In fact, I have a list of specific questions that I'd like your group to address. The overarching question is: how should we enhance ARSOF professional education to ensure our units can successfully execute the missions of the next 20 years? The three underlying questions that get at the heart of this big question are:

1. Why should the organizational structure of the ARSOF community differ from that of the GPF?
2. To execute our expected mission set, what type of professional competencies does the ARSOF community need?
3. How could we structure an ARSOF education system to provide our professionals with the competencies that you identify?

I also want you to limit the size and scope of your working group. I do not see any need to involve anyone outside this headquarters; the people in our subordinate units certainly have their plates full with current operations. My final request is that I want you to scale your research in a particular way. I want you to focus on Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs folks. I do not want you to focus your attention on the Rangers or the 160th pilots; the regimental commanders are working a separate plan for me regarding their people. Touch base with me before you head out for the day and propose whom you think should be in the working group.

DCO: Roger sir, I got it.

To: CG, USASOC
From: DCO, USASOC
Subject: PME Working Group

Sir,

These people will comprise the PME working group we discussed earlier today:

ARSOF Duty Position	Rank	Bona Fides
Deputy Intelligence Officer Intel	LTC	4 yrs MI basic branch 11 yrs SF experience
Aide de Camp ADC	MAJ	4 yrs FA basic branch 9 yrs SF experience
Clinical Psychologist Doc	MAJ	8 yrs enlisted CA experience
Operations Sergeant Ops	SFC	14 yrs SF experience

We will conduct our initial research, show you our data, and recommend ways ARSOF could proceed given the information we find.

V/R
DCO

To: DCO, USASOC
From: CG, USASOC
Subject: RE: PME Working Group

Looks good DCO, execute!

CG

A. ARSOF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

ADC: Let's begin our research by comparing the organizational designs and cultures of ARSOF and GPF. I think organizational design is one of the most important, yet underutilized analytical tools in the Army and I agree with LTG(R) Dubik who says:

> Even the best people will be constrained—perhaps driven out—by poor organizational structures and cultures. We all live and operate within an organizational context. An organization's climate affects the contributions of individuals and the achievement of the common mission.[3]

INTEL: How will organizational design help us prove that our guys should be different from GPF guys? From my perspective, we are organized just like the GPF: they have companies, we have companies; they have regiments, we have groups. Isn't that about as different as it gets?

ADC: No sir, I don't think it is that simple. It is true that our organizational nomenclature and infrastructure are similar, but "a great many problems in organizational design stem from the assumption that organizations are all alike: mere collections of component parts to which elements of structure can be added and deleted at will, a sort of organizational bazaar."[4] What makes us different is the fact that ARSOF is an organization comprised of adhocracies while the GPF much more closely resemble professional bureaucracies.

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[3] LTG (R) James M. Dubik, "Preparing for Your Future and That of the U.S. Army," *Army Magazine*, (2010), http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/january2010/Pages/Preparing%20for%20Your%20Future%20and%20That%20of%20the%20U.S.%20Army.aspx

[4] Henry Mintzberg, "Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?" *Harvard Business Review* (1981): 2.

DOC: OK, you gentlemen are going to have to work with me for a bit. Help me understand the difference between professional bureaucracies and adhocracies before we get into a discussion of how they apply to Army units and soldiers.

ADC: Not a problem Doc, my last company commander graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School and structured a company professional development program around the things he learned out there. I saved the design slide he gave us and I just pulled it up on my Blackberry. You guys pass it around and take a look. While you are reading the slide, please keep in mind that the distinctions between the two organizational structures, the naming conventions, and the definitions are not mine, and that the slide is a conglomeration of ideas taken from world-renowned organizational theorist Dr. Henry Mintzberg.[5]

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[5] The Mintzberg ideas, drawn from his *Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?* and seminar notes taken during Dr. Erik Jansen's Spring 2009 Naval Postgraduate School class titled "Organizational Design for Special Operations," are presented here to provide a basic understanding of the differences between professional bureaucracies and adhocracies. The distinctions are not comprehensive; however, they provide the reader with the requisite knowledge for following this chapter's argument.

Professional Bureaucracy

- Coordination achieved by standardization of skills
- Best in complex-stable environments
- Focus is perfection of existing knowledge

Adhocracy

- Coordination achieved by mutual adjustment
- Best in complex-dynamic environments
- Focus is innovation and tailored solutions

Standardization of Skills: Training-based command and control mechanism

Mutual Adjustment: Command and control mechanism based on informal communication

Complex-Stable: Low to moderate uncertainty; some friction; requires some planning

Complex-Dynamic: High uncertainty; extensive friction; extensive planning and forecasting

Figure 1.   Organizational Design

DOC: Got it.

ADC: OK, I see why ARSOF units need to be adhocracies; because we generally deploy as relatively small teams, we do a good job reacting swiftly to change and adapting well to changing environments. What really constrains GPF from reacting and adapting in the same manner is not a lack of any specific ability, it is a function of their organization. The real value of ARSOF's organization as an adhocracy is that the sum of the parts is greater than the whole, which is directly attributable to our ability to organize operational teams according to anticipated mission requirements. The major difference between GPF and us is that SF, CA, and PSYOP teams have flexible organizational structures and cultures and "nothing ever seems to get done without everyone talking to

everyone else. Ambiguity abounds, giving rise to all sorts of conflicts and political pressures. Adhocracy can do no ordinary thing well. But it is extraordinary at innovation."[6]

I think one of the strengths of the ARSOF community requiring revitalization in accordance with our original charter is our innovative style of conducting non-standard missions without detracting from the GPF's ability to continue honing their core competencies. The delineation between GPF and ARSOF is not "either-or," it is "yes, and." Both organizations have specialty areas and, in some cases, our areas will overlap either by design or by necessity. The key to determining why our organizational structure should differ from the GPF is to remember why we were created and to determine what our history means for our future.

INTEL: I think I can help with the ARSOF background data that we will need to frame our discussion. I had to write an information paper about ARSOF history last year at Fort Leavenworth and present it to my small group. Why don't we break for lunch and you guys can read it and tell me if it is relevant at 1300.

The history of Army Special Operations Forces is rooted in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). World War II OSS veterans Colonels Aaron Bank and Russell Volckmann were the vanguard that brought ARSOF into existence and their reason for establishing ARSOF elements is generally described this way:

> Special operations, as envisioned by the two men, and by Bank in particular, were a force multiplier: a small number of soldiers who could sow a disproportionately large amount of trouble for the enemy. Confusion would reign among enemy ranks and objectives would be accomplished with an extreme economy of manpower.[7]

Bank and Volkmann received a helping hand from Secretary of the Army Frank Pace who, in 1951, pressured the Army General Council to create the Office of the Chief

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[6] Mintzberg, "Organizational Design," 12.

[7] Global Security, "Early Cold War Army Special Operations," *Global Security: Military*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arsoc-history3.htm.

of Psychological Warfare (OCPW).[8] As the first leader of OCPW, Brigadier General Robert McClure recruited WWII veterans with considerable experience in guerrilla warfare and with operating behind enemy lines. McClure saw the need for a force capable of conducting special operations, and he accepted the view of OCPW's Special Operations Division Chief, Colonel Volkmann, that such missions should include:

1. Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare
2. Sabotage and subversion
3. Evasion and escape
4. Ranger and Commando-like operations
5. Long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance
6. Psychological warfare[9]

Under the Congressional provisions of the Lodge Bill, McClure formed an OSS-like special unit comprised mainly of immigrants from Eastern Europe who were capable of training guerrilla armies in Soviet occupied areas, as well as conducting other unconventional operations deep inside enemy territory. Special Operation Forces morphed from their OSS roots into the modern form during America's involvement in Southeast Asia.

"With Operation White Star in Laos and the increasing requirements associated with the advisory mission in Vietnam, the need for ARSOF grew. By 1969, there were almost thirteen thousand men in seven Special Forces groups."[10] In the aftermath of the failed Iranian Hostage Rescue mission (1979) and the lessons learned from Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada (1983), Congress fought for and won an increased capability for all military special operations in general, and ARSOF in particular. On December 1, 1989, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) took control of

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[8] For detailed information regarding Secretary of the Army Frank Pace's impact on the creation of the OCPW, refer to Alfred H. Paddock Jr., "The Road to Fort Bragg," in *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002).

[9] Alfred H. Paddock Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002).

[10] Dick Couch, *Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior* (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2007), 277.

all ARSOF forces. Throughout their existence, ARSOF units have been organizations filled with professionals capable of operating independently or as small teams in order to conduct non-standard missions in complex environments.

DOC: Ok, I went over the history paper during lunch and I think I have a grasp of the organizational design requirements essential for ARSOF professionals. Let me give you my conclusions and you tell me if I understand the picture of ARSOF you are painting. First, because ARSOF teams conduct non-standard missions, they must maintain a tremendous amount of organizational flexibility such that the control mechanisms in one team may be completely unlike those in another team. Second, informal communication, both internal and external to the teams, is required to ensure mission accomplishment because teams that share organizational office space in garrison may conduct operations in completely different geographical and cultural areas when deployed. Finally, ARSOF teams routinely accomplish missions beyond the scope of many GPF elements due to their small size, unique skill set, and flexible operational acumen.

ADC: Doc, I think your conclusions along with the following statement regarding ARSOF organizational culture present an excellent justification for ARSOF elements being organized the way they are.

> The history of U.S. special operations forces is in many ways separate from that of American conventional military forces and has resulted in an organizational culture—values, beliefs, and perspective—distinct within the American military. Special operators fight a different kind of war. A war that often involves more training of other forces than fighting. A war that frequently requires observation rather than attack. A war that pits a handful of special operators against large conventional forces. A war that is most likely to take place during peacetime, before and after military conflict, in an attempt to prevent crises or put things back together if war is unavoidable. Special operators know their history and see its effect on who they are today.[11]

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[11] Susan Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997), 264.

INTEL: Following the assertion that ARSOF fights a different kind of war to its logical conclusion, retired Major General Sidney Shachnow, a 32-year veteran of the Special Forces provides an excellent description of the type of professionals required to conduct ARSOF missions. Recalling his conversation with Shachnow, author Robert D. Kaplan writes:

> A Special Forces guy, Shachnow told me, has to be a lethal killer one moment and a humanitarian the next. He has to know how to get strangers who speak another language to do things for him. He has to go from knowing enough Russian to knowing enough Arabic in just a few weeks, depending on the deployment. We need people who are cultural quick studies. Shachnow was talking about a knack for dealing with people, almost a form of charisma. The right man will know how to behave in a given situation—will know how to find things out and act on them.[12]

Although Shachnow limited his comments to members of one component of the total ARSOF organization, I think we all agree that the same requirements are generally true of PSYOP and CA professionals.

OPS: Now that we have reviewed the type of organization that ARSOF is and where it came from, we need to spend some time explaining why ARSOF professionals should maintain these historical differences in support of whatever our country's future missions turn out to be.

INTEL: Interestingly enough, I recently completed a review of the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 and the Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) article *The Army of the 21ˢᵗ Century* and I think these two documents provide a good discussion of the possible future operating contexts. I think we should rely heavily on the JOE and refrain from using ARSOF or SOCOM analysis so that we can avoid giving the CG assessments and recommendations open to criticism as ARSOF-centric, one-sided, or too narrow in scope.

ADC: Sir, I think that's wise. While you have the floor, I'd appreciate it if you would go ahead and frame the potential future operating environment for us.

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[12] Robert D. Kaplan, "Supremacy by Stealth," *The Atlantic Monthly* (2003): 65.

INTEL: The part of the JOE that I found most interesting was the opening statement regarding the context of international interaction for the next twenty years. The JFCOM analysis is significantly different from most prognostications we see from Washington-based think tanks; JFCOM's analysis is that "despite serious challenges to international stability by unconventional powers using a variety of tools and methods, cooperation and competition among conventional powers will continue to be a primary operational context for the Joint Force for the next 25 years."[13]

Even though intelligence analysis and prediction is certainly not a zero sum game, I think the JFCOM framing is important because it points to the fact that state-on-state warfare is a concept that is going to dominate international relations well into the future. Our military in general, and the land forces of the GPF in particular, must maintain the capability to win large-scale battles with overwhelming force. Understanding that the Army is America's primary land-based fighting force, I don't think the CSA's assessment of the future operating environment puts as much emphasis as it should on maintaining a GPF force-on-force capability. I think the Army is pushing too hard to turn itself into an organization configured to conduct unconventional operations. The CSA seemed intent on tilting the focus of the GPF too far out of balance toward unconventional operations when he wrote:

> Given the emerging security environment, the evolving character of conflict, and the Secretary of Defense's vision of balance in our defense strategy, we see four roles for land forces in the 21st century: *prevail* in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; *engage* to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies; *support* civil authorities at home and abroad; *deter and defeat* hybrid threats and hostile state actors.[14]

I think it is probably wise for the Army to increase its ability to conduct what it terms "hybrid" or "irregular" warfare; I just don't think it should do this at the expense of its conventional capability, which increasingly appears to be what the Army is doing. Too great a focus by the GPF on changing its organizational structure or its leader

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[13] United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2010* (Suffolk, 2009), 38.

[14] General George W. Casey Jr., "The Army of the 21st Century," *Army Magazine* (October 2009): 26.

professional development program will create a situation in which we have a large GPF with a greatly degraded capacity to conduct conventional warfare. Further, transitioning a professional bureaucracy into an organization comprised of professionals capable of conducting effective irregular operations across all three levels of war would be a monumental undertaking requiring decades to complete.

Speaking of irregular warfare, in addition to the discussion of major state-on-state war, the JOE posits what I think is a crucial warning:

> The second scenario of particular significance confronting the Joint Force is the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s. The difficulties involved in training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push preparations to fight irregular war into the background, as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War.[15]

In his discussion of the future operating environment, the CSA basically says that the structure of the GPF, as well as the traditional abilities of GPF professionals, requires an almost total restructuring. The following is General Casey in his own words.

> The future is not simply irregular warfare by nonstate actors—adversaries can be expected to use a full spectrum of options, including every political, economic, informational and military measure at their disposal. When combined with cultural and demographic factors, these measures will present U.S. military leaders with complex challenges that will require increasingly complex solutions. Hybrid threats necessitate hybrid solutions, and such solutions increasingly require military forces that are adaptive and versatile enough to function in a variety of situations against myriad threats with a diverse set of national, allied and indigenous partners.[16]

What I am trying to point out with this comparison between the CSA's vision of the future and JFCOM's analysis is that our future operating environment will be more complex than ever before in the history of our country.

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[15] United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment*, 62.

[16] Casey, *Army Magazine*, 28.

I am fully aware that neither the analysis I read you nor my commentary is groundbreaking, but where I am going with this line of discussion is to an assessment of what JFCOM and the GPF see as the type of professional required to conduct operations in our future operating context.

Published in November 2009, *A Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) for a 21st Century Army*, is the CSA-approved guidance for leader development. "The ALDS builds on an accrual of skills, at each level and over time, to prepare leaders for increased responsibility. It is important to note that any development model we pursue must be built on a foundation of **lethality** [sic] as the unique capability we deliver to the nation."[17] When compared to the CSA's written statement from a month prior, this statement seems to place too great an emphasis on kinetic operations: "being versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable and interoperable are the defining qualities of a balanced Army."[18] The ALDS also appears mechanistic and too highly standardized when it delineates the Army's professional expectations by virtue of rank.

For instance, here is a summary of the GPF's expected proficiencies by leader grouping:

> Our junior leaders must achieve and sustain mastery of mission essential weapons, equipment and systems. We want our junior level leaders to anticipate transitions within tactical operations and act upon opportunities. We want them to appreciate the complexity of the security environment in which they operate and have sufficient knowledge of geo-politics, culture, language, and information operations to recognize the need to consult experts.
>
> Mid-grade leaders will possess self-awareness skills in order to come to grips with the reality that their subordinates possess individual proficiencies that exceed their own. We expect them to become masters of military science; those who display an inclination will become apprentices

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[17] United States Department of the Army, "A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army," Department of the Army, https://atn.army.mil/media/docs/A%20Leader%20Development%20Strategy%20for%20an%20Expeditionary%20Army%2011%20SEP%2009%20(Approved).pdf

[18] Casey, *Army Magazine,* 34.

in operational art. . . . It is at this level that leaders begin to understand how their formations enable the work of the multitude of civilian organizations they will encounter outside the joint and coalition formation.

Senior leaders contribute to the development and implementation of national and geo-political strategy. They astutely manage complexity, and anticipate transitions at campaign level. They embody the expertise and the wisdom within our Army. These leaders operate within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment as a matter of routine and lead across those boundaries to advance national interests. They coordinate and synchronize combined operations with allied and coalition partners, interagency organizations, and a range of civilian organizations. They determine and deliver effects across the spectrum of conflict.[19]

DOC: It sounds to me like the Army's GPF comprise a professional bureaucracy attempting to change its design and culture while simultaneously adhering to the same hierarchical professional education system in place since the 1970s. Based on what you have provided us, I can't help but agree with Dr. Arthur T. Coumbe of the Strategic Studies Institute, who believes the Army's professional development system "subordinates intellectual and strategic astuteness to tactical and operational expertise."[20]

OPS: Yeah Doc, my major problem is with the GPF leader development strategy as well. What these guys describe as the desired endstate for senior leaders is exactly what we expect of the people on our detachments and teams. ARSOF captains and staff sergeants are the ones who must be able to "coordinate and synchronize combined operations with allied and coalition partners, interagency organizations, and a range of civilian organizations."[21] Our tactical level leaders are the ones who "determine and deliver effects across the spectrum of conflict."[22] On the other hand, I think it is safe to assume that we expect our senior leaders to execute many of the tasks that the GPF assigns to those they call their entry-level leaders. Our Joint Special Operations Task

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[19] United States Department of the Army, "A Leader Development Strategy," 12–13.

[20] Arthur T. Coumbe, *Army Officer Development: Historical Context* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 14.

[21] United States Department of the Army, "A Leader Development Strategy," 13.

[22] Ibid., 13.

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Force (JSOTF) commanders, Theater Special Operations (TSOC) commanders, along with all our field grade commanders and senior level staff officers are people we need to "anticipate transitions within tactical operations . . . while they concurrently appreciate the complexity of the security environment in which they operate."[23] As force providing commanders, ARSOF field grade and senior leaders are the professionals who should "have sufficient knowledge of geo-politics, culture, language, and information operations to recognize the need to consult experts, which in many cases will be our junior professionals—those on our detachments and teams."[24]

ADC: Gentlemen, I would summarize your discussion that ARSOF organizational structure should differ from that of GPF in the following manner: given their sheer personnel numbers and organizational missions, the GPF may still need a more routinized assembly-line approach to PME that takes place in stages and does not introduce strategy until the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and Sergeant Major. We, on the other hand, choose to agree with Ohio State University Professor Emeritus Williamson Murray who recently gave the following testimony before a United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Professional Military Education:

> Educating officers [and we believe NCOs] in stages has the consequence that producing a mind that is able to grasp the strategic level of war requires the transition to a broader understanding of conflict from their earlier conditioning. Not many manage that transition, which is why real strategists are so rare. Improving the analytic capabilities of officers [and NCOs] and teaching them how to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity should begin before commissioning [and at initial entry for enlisted professionals] and be pursued concurrently with training throughout the whole professional development process.[25]

DOC: As I listened to your summary, I sketched out this graphic to highlight the differences between the CSA's view as outlined in the ALDS and our ARSOF-specific assessment of human capital development.

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[23] United States Department of the Army, "A Leader Development Strategy," 12.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Williamson Murray, *Transcript of testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Professional Military Education* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009), 9.

Organizational Investment in Human Capital Development

GPF

Senior Leaders

Mid-Grade Leaders

Junior Leaders

ARSOF

Senior Leaders

Mid-Grade Leaders

Junior Leaders

The conventional Army's professional development system "subordinates intellectual and strategic astuteness to tactical and operational expertise." —**Dr. Arthur T. Coumbe**

Figure 2.   Human Capital Development

INTEL: I like how our argument is shaping up and I think we should include a discussion of how lessons learned impact GPF versus how they impact the ARSOF community. For our purposes, it might be helpful to frame the discussion with an analogy from the world of construction. Concerning organizational design and culture, the GPF typically uses "lessons learned" to rebuild its organizations while ARSOF organizations generally approach fixing themselves from a remodeling perspective. In many cases, rebuilding is useful and appropriate but it is also very costly. Rebuilding requires the investment of large amounts of time and human capital, and it has a significant impact on operational capacity. The relationship between rebuilding an organization and that organization's ability to impact current operations are zero sums. Simply stated, to the degree that GPF focus on rebuilding; they have a diminished ability to project power and affect current operations. In contrast to the conventional process of using lessons learned

to drive massive restructuring, ARSOF organizations typically adhere to the principle of making incremental changes based on a holistic assessment of their organizational "fit" within the operational environment.

ADC: I hear you arguing that GPF seek to change the context based on lessons learned while ARSOF organizations seek to influence and then control the context by working through the local people responsible for managing the context.

OPS: Sir, that's exactly what I am hearing and I wholeheartedly agree. I think the handling of the Civilian Irregular Defense Corps (CIDG) program during Vietnam provides a good historical example of this. The CIDG plan was "the centerpiece of the U.S.-sponsored internal development effort in Vietnam . . . to create support among the peasants and cut off that same population as a source of support for the Viet Cong."[26] Author Thomas K. Adams describes the GPF's plan to change the context in Vietnam with the CIDG program in the following manner:

> The CIDG militia units were the essential element of the program, since without military protection, the Viet Cong would simply seize control. These self-defense groups were to be established at the village level where they would pacify the immediate area, meaning they would keep Viet Cong elements out of the village, patrol the local area and defeat or expel any Viet Cong units encountered. The pacified areas surrounding CIDG area development camps were to be integrated into the already existing national strategic hamlet program.[27]

The program, executed exclusively by SF soldiers, sought to influence rather than overtly change the prevailing context by establishing "the first grass-roots intelligence system to collect detailed, systematic information on the NLF (National Liberation Front) and the VC (Viet Cong). The SF teams simultaneously conducted numerous simple civil affairs programs."[28] As the CIDG program became increasingly successful, the Army bureaucracy showed a:

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[26] Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 83.

[27] Ibid., 84.

[28] Ibid., 85.

building sentiment for getting SF and their CIDG soldiers out of the village-defense business and into the jungles chasing VC, and DOD [sic] actively sought to do just that. Thus began a theme that would be repeated over and over again. The SF would repeatedly train village-defense forces, only to see them marched off for conventional combat or diverted to other purposes.[29]

The CIDG program lost most of its effectiveness, and the military leadership phased it out completely after its came under GPF control and its focus was shifted, thanks to external pressures. Taking into account the fact that the CIDG program's initial success was due to SF's ability to effectively work with and train Vietnamese forces, it is interesting to note that in less than a year, the CIDG program was halted. "The official U.S. Army Lessons Learned for 1965 recommended that additional emphasis be placed on training in basic infantry techniques and small unit tactics."[30] What I find interesting about the story is the fact that the SF units involved with the CIDG program were successful because they were able to able to assess the situation without placing themselves inside the narrative unfolding in front of them.

In the second part of his book, Adams makes two points that I think are very applicable to our discussion. In addressing the success of the CIDG program before GPF took control, he writes that the CIDG was successful because of its adherence to the concept that "unconventional-warfare operators must be able to operate outside their own cultural milieu."[31] Adams goes on to note that "the Army Special Forces in Vietnam was able [sic] to attract such flexible persons, place them in appropriate positions and allow them the latitude to create their own jobs in the absence of useful doctrine or national policy."[32] In contrast, the GPF sought to change the existing social context in Vietnam by placing itself in the middle of the narrative and then attempted to restructure the environment to the Army's liking. Adams describes a point of view that I think still applies to today's GPF:

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[29] Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, 87.

[30] Ibid., 92.

[31] Ibid., 146.

[32] Ibid.

The dominance of the Army paradigm and its resulting puzzle solutions (the military-technical approach and the conventional model of warfighting) had important impacts on the prosecution of the war. Once the 1965 decision was made to introduce large numbers of U.S. troops, it was inevitable that the military effort, with its greater resources, would become the dominant influence on U.S. policy in Vietnam.[33]

I think we should use Adams' research to show, as an organization and regardless of the GPF's educational curriculum, it will always make itself the central figure in a military campaign because it is organized as a professional bureaucracy. This is the opposite of ARSOF.

DOC: Now we need to address the one thing that we haven't explicitly covered in our discussion thus far. What does the history of ARSOF portend for the future?

ADC: The relevance of our history to our future is that the Army specifically created ARSOF units as small flexible teams for two broad purposes. The first reason for creating ARSOF organizations as small scalable units was to enable them to train and conduct combined operations with foreign indigenous forces operating deep inside enemy territory. The second reason for ARSOF's enduring organizational design is to provide the President of the United States with a force capable of conducting America's special operations in such a fashion as to maximize strategic gains while simultaneously minimizing resource expenditures, collateral damage, unnecessary exposure, and unintended consequences. Many of the organizational and cultural changes discussed by the CSA have been part of ARSOF since their creation.

INTEL: Do the notions that emerging challenges "will require a fundamentally different Army from the one we had before 9/11,"[34] and that "the challenges of institutional change in large organizations like the Army are substantial, especially as we are adapting an organization that is already the best in the world at what it does"[35] hold any meaning for us?

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[33] Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, 147.

[34] Ibid., 30.

[35] Ibid., 40.

ADC: I think those views are probably correct when applied to GPF, but I don't think they hold anywhere other than maybe at the margins when applied to ARSOF units. Further, Mintzberg's belief that "sometimes an organization's management, recognizing the need for internal consistency, hives off a part in need of special treatment,"[36] but that "it is difficult to corner off a small component and pretend that it will not be influenced by the rest"[37] requires consideration.

INTEL: Based on everything that I have read, the GPF is attempting to revolutionize almost every aspect of its organization while simultaneously trying to inculcate many of the functional skills that have been the hallmark of ARSOF professionals since the era of Colonels Bank and Volckmann. I believe the GPF Forces have correctly realized that their current organization is incongruent with the emerging security environment. However, while many observers believe the Army has the wrong structure in the right situation, my view is pretty much in line with the CSA who believes that "one truism about predicting the future is that we will never get it exactly right; indeed, we can only aspire not to be too wrong."[38] That said, the GPF leadership has the choice "between evolution and revolution, between perpetual mild adaptation, which favors external fit over time, and infrequent major realignment, which favors internal consistency over time."[39]

As we discussed earlier, JFCOM's analysis of the emerging security environment between now and 2035 unequivocally finds that "the state will continue to be the most powerful international actor."[40] The key point JFCOM makes is that "the power of states will vary dramatically from culture to culture, region to region but will mutate and adapt to the international environment's changing conditions as a **centralized** mechanism through which power is organized."[41] Accepting the current GPF organizational structure

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[36] Mintzberg, "Organizational Design," 13.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Casey, *Army Magazine*, 30.

[39] Mintzberg, "Organizational Design," 14.

[40] United States Joint Forces Command, "The Joint Operating Environment," 38.

[41] Ibid., author's emphasis.

and JFCOM's analysis of the future leads me to the counterintuitive conclusion that maybe the Army's GPF should maintain the organizational construct they have had since WWII. I am not advocating a rigid adherence to what worked in the past regardless of the current or future context. However, as discussed by organizational theorist Henry Mintzberg, I believe in the notion of maintaining the status quo at least long enough to determine whether the organization should attempt to change the environment or if the organization should allow the environment to change it.

> The way to deal with the right structure in the wrong environment may be to change the environment, not the structure . . . . An organization cannot be all things to all people. It should do what it does well and suffer the consequences.[42]

OPS: If the GPF does decide to stick with its current plan to undertake a massive restructuring, as I think it will, it would do well to listen to the advice of Mark Moyer, who writes:

> Recently, some reformers have advocated making the U.S. Army an adaptive organization by transforming the organizational culture through new policies, incentives, educational programs, and organizational structures. The desired final product—an adaptive organization—is the correct one, but the instruments proposed for creating it are inadequate; they cannot reshape an organization by themselves any more than chisels and rasps alone can change the shape of marble.[43]

The Army's GPF appears to be suffering from an identity crisis in that it wants to combine the adaptability of an adhocracy's people with the stability of a bureaucracy's hierarchical structure. Speaking bluntly, a professional "bureaucracy in a dynamic industry calling for constant innovation or, alternately, a flexible adhocracy in a stable industry calling for minimum cost makes no sense."[44] The more ARSOF and GPF converge, it is more likely we will see a force consisting of unconventional warfare professionals organized in such a highly conventional structure that they will be unable to

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[42] Mintzberg, "Organizational Design," 14.

[43] Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 260.

[44] Mintzberg, "Organizational Design," 13.

"interact more closely with the population and focus on operations that bring stability, while shielding them [the population] from insurgent violence, corruption and coercion."[45]

ADC: Is it fair, then, to say that the ARSOF community should be different than the GPF in both organizational structure and mission set because allowing for an ARSOF-GPF convergence would result in a decrease in ARSOF's ability to conduct the missions they were created to conduct?

INTEL: I know you'll get no disagreement from the SF guys in the room. Do you have any issues with that conclusion Doc?

DOC: I have no problem with it. The conclusion is predicated on well-documented history and the widely accepted principles of organizational theory. Obviously, there are going to be critics, but those who disagree with us will do so as a matter of perspective more than for any other reason.

ADC: As far as I am concerned, we are now at the point that, drawing on our history and an analysis of the evolving strategic operating environment, we need to explore the type of ARSOF professionals we think we need in order to execute ARSOF's expected future mission set. Why don't we start there tomorrow? You guys go ahead and do whatever you need to do while I take the last few minutes of the day to send the DCO an update showing him what we have accomplished so far.

> **To: DCO, USASOC**
> **From: Aide-de-Camp**
> **Subject: PME Working Group #1**
>
> Sir,
>
> IPR #1 slides are attached; slide one is our BLUF while 2-3 provide supporting information.
>
> V/R
> ADC

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[45] Stanley A. McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment* (Kabul: Headquarters, International Security Force, 2009), 1–2.

Why should the organizational structure of the ARSOF community differ from that of the GPF?

Because of their organizational design, ARSOF provide America's leadership the ability to maximize strategic gains while simultaneously minimizing expenditures, exposure, and unintended consequences. GPF, while effective, do not provide the same capabilities.

Figure 3.   Summary Slide, Question #1

Organizational Design

Conventional

- Coordination achieved by standardization of skills
- Best in complex-stable environments
- Focus is perfection of existing knowledge

ARSOF

- Coordination achieved by mutual adjustment
- Best in complex-dynamic environments
- Focus is innovation and tailored solutions

"An organization cannot be all things to all people. It should do what it does well and suffer the consequences."   —**Henry Mintzberg**

Figure 4.   Organizational Design

Organizational Investment in Human Capital Development

GPF

Senior Leaders

Mid-Grade Leaders

Junior Leaders

ARSOF

Senior Leaders

Mid-Grade Leaders

Junior Leaders

The conventional Army's professional development system "subordinates intellectual and strategic astuteness to tactical and operational expertise." —**Dr. Arthur T. Coumbe**

Figure 5.   Human Capital Development

B.   ARSOF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCIES

ADC: The boss requires me to complete a book report every couple of months and I read a passage last night that did a good job encapsulating the type of ARSOF leader that would fill our ranks in a perfect world:

I suspect that despite the limited understanding we have of events in distant places, there will always be those among us who have the gleam of the quest in their eyes. They are people of every sex and station and they yearn to be challenged to a cause. They will always be looking for that wrong to right, that ill to cure, that song to sing; and there will always be those who will go to arms in aid of the helpless and the downtrodden. Ignoring the political issues of the moment, these people will champion the weak and the poor in the face of evil and tyranny. And no matter what

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the outcome, in their romantic hearts they will keep the secret, if secret it must be, that they are better men for having held the lamp beside the golden door.[46]

DOC: You are right when you discuss having a leader who can do everything all of the time as part of a perfect world. From my perspective as a psychologist, I can tell you that it is virtually impossible to always slate the perfect people against the appropriate tasks for their skill level.

OPS: Gentlemen, as the lone NCO on the team, I think we need to remember that we are not searching for THE answer to the question, but that we are sifting through the multitude of answers that are out there and summarizing them for the DCO. First, we need to agree on the types of missions that we foresee requiring ARSOF involvement in the next couple of decades. Second, we need to identify the skills and abilities required to accomplish these missions. After we do those two things, I believe we can develop a basic profile of what we believe these types of professionals should look like.

ADC: You have laid out a good course of action. Let's take a look at the SOF core activities and see if we are comfortable validating them as necessary for the next twenty years. Army Field Manual 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces* states that ARSOF currently have the following nine core tasks:

- Direct Action (DA)
- Special Reconnaissance (SR)
- Unconventional Warfare (UW)
- Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
- Civil Affairs Operations (CA)
- Counterterrorism (CT)
- Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
- Support to Information Operations (IO)
- Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)[47]

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[46] David Donovan (pseud.), *Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Ballantine Books, 1985), 300.

[47] United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05 Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C., 2006), 2–1.

I know that everyone in this room is quite familiar with the descriptions of these tasks, but if you ever need a concise description of them, I recommend taking a look at Admiral Olson's *Joint Forces Quarterly* article "U.S. Special Operations: Context and Capabilities in Irregular Warfare*"* published in Issue 56, 1st quarter of 2010.[48]

Now that we have these core tasks listed, let's take a look at the definition of a "special operation:"

> Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.[49]

This definition is very broad and it allows us maximum flexibility given the types of missions we might be called on to perform during the next twenty years. Let's evaluate the ARSOF core tasks against this definition and see if we can narrow the scope of expected standalone mission sets for our research. Then we will be able to tell when and if there are any additional missions that we should add to the list.

OPS: Sir, I have been a non-commissioned officer in the Special Operations community for a long time and, although it is a very unpopular view, I want us to make the argument that DA should not be classified as a standalone mission. Army Field Manual 3-05 defines DA as "short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and that employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture,

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[48] Admiral Eric T. Olson is the Commander, United States Special Operations Command.

[49] United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, D.C., 2003), GL–11.

exploit, recover, or damage designated targets."[50] The manual goes on to say that "DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives."[51] Our doctrine makes it a point to state that DA missions have a very limited scope, are time sensitive, and require a precise application of force. I believe that SOCOM has the ability to conduct these missions utilizing elements other than PSYOP, CA, and SF forces. I know the DCO's guidance was to stay away from discussions of the 75th Ranger Regiment's mission sets, and I am certainly not arguing that we should lay down our arms and refuse to conduct another close-combat operation. However, I do think the Ranger Regiment, Navy SEALs, and other SOCOM elements can conduct the lion's share of the work when it comes to "seizing, destroying, capturing, or recovering through short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions in denied areas."[52]

I am not arguing that DA is not a special operation, I am merely pointing out the fact that there are other Special Operations Forces in the United States military better suited to conduct DA, as a standalone mission, than the ARSOF forces we are concerned with as part of this project.

The founders of ARSOF forces, especially SF, created us specifically to conduct SR, UW, and FID missions. A look at our history helps make my point and adds some academic rigor to my argument. The 10th Special Forces Group is our longest standing group and it was the first formal Army peacetime unit ever dedicated to special operations. The unit's wartime mission was to develop, organize, train, equip and direct anti-Soviet resistance forces in Eastern Europe in the event of war with the USSR."[53]

Then, "on 24 June 1957, the 1st Special Forces Group was activated at Camp Drake, Japan . . . and was immediately transferred to the island of Okinawa, where it organized Mobile Training Teams to instruct Asian allies in unconventional warfare

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[50] United States Department of the Army, *FM 3-05*, 2–3.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces*, 55.

tactics."[54] Finally, "members of the 77th SFG were deployed to Laos in 1959 under civilian cover to assist French UW forces training the Laotian Army."[55] The missions undertaken by these early SF units were textbook special operations even according to the current ARSOF definition of UW. FM 3-05 describes UW as:

> A broad range of military and/or paramilitary operations and activities, normally of long duration, conducted through, with, or by indigenous or other surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and otherwise directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW operations can be conducted across the range of conflict against regular and irregular forces. These forces may or may not be State-sponsored.[56]

Unconventional Warfare is arguably the most important mission that ARSOF forces must prepare for, and this is no less true today than during WWII. Today's SF and PSYOP units trace their history to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which came to fruition during World War II. "The OSS's unconventional warfare mission laid the foundation for today's Special Forces, emphasizing training of foreign indigenous forces and regional orientation of American forces (including strong foreign language and cultural training)."[57] The founding fathers of Special Forces, Aaron Bank and Russell Volckmann, chartered the organization with a focus on UW. They believed the SF mission was "to infiltrate by air, sea, or land deep into enemy-controlled territory and to stay, organize, equip, train, control, and direct indigenous personnel in the conduct of Special Forces operations."[58]

The point that I am making with this history lesson about UW is twofold. First, UW by its very nature is a special operation; we conduct UW to achieve U.S. strategic aims in politically sensitive areas. Second, as long as most people in our world organize themselves around the Westphalian state model, the United States will have interests in those states requiring ARSOF to work with indigenous or surrogate forces to protect

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[54] Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces*, 58.

[55] Ibid., 62.

[56] United States Department of the Army, *FM 3-05*, 2–1.

[57] Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare*, 9.

[58] Ibid., 11.

those interests. Furthermore, the emergence of non-state actors like Al Qaeda makes it even more critical that we retain and expand our capability to conduct UW well into the future.

If the need for behind-the-lines UW was realized during WWII, the requirement for forces specifically trained and equipped to conduct FID was born during the Kennedy administration and the run up to America's involvement in Vietnam. While addressing the United States Military Academy class of 1962, President Kennedy stated:

> This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him . . . It requires in those situations where we must counter it . . . a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.[59]

"Although few American military leaders believed that the conflict would be resolved through the patient training of South Vietnamese forces and improved civil-military relations in Vietnam, U.S. Army Special Forces played this role in Vietnam."[60] From its beginnings in the rice paddies of Vietnam, FID has evolved as an ARSOF mission to the point that it is conducted almost constantly across the entire range of military operations in a myriad of operating environments. FM 3-05 says the following about FID:

> FID is a subset of stability operations. These operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Army forces, including ARSOF (particularly SF and PSYOP), accomplish stability goals through security cooperation. The military activities that support these operations are diverse, continuous, and often long-term. Their purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability. Stability operations employ Army forces, including ARSOF (particularly CA), to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises. The primary

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[59] Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 29–30.

[60] Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare*, 14.

role of stability operations is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups, for a limited time, until civil authorities can accomplish these tasks without military assistance.[61]

I like the fact that the FM describes, rather than defines, FID. In this instance, I believe the doctrine truly does the actual mission justice. Due to the holistic nature and long-term focus of FID, and understanding that the goal of FID is to resource host nation (HN) and paramilitary forces "to maintain the HN's internal stability, to counter subversion and violence in their country, and to address the causes of instability,"[62] ARSOF forces are uniquely qualified to conduct FID operations. Population security, host nation military assistance, and counterinsurgency (the three components of FID) lead me to believe that ARSOF officers cannot afford to be doctrinaire about this mission.

When conducting FID, as well as all special operations, the officer leader:

must approach each conflict with a distinctive theory of victory; there should be no formulae specifying what ought to work. Rather than assigning the operational tasks of SOF to fit a traditional understanding of SOF capabilities, it is important that flexible SOF be tailored to novel operational tasks.[63]

Nowhere is this more true that when conducting FID.

Special reconnaissance is the third mission that I believe ARSOF must remain prepared to accomplish over the course of the next twenty years. Regardless of the nature of our enemies, our senior military and political leaders will always require special reconnaissance in order to hold diplomatic engagements, conduct deterrence operations, and preside over covert or clandestine military operations conducted to protect American interests abroad. JP 3-05 defines SR "as reconnaissance and surveillance actions

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[61] United States Department of the Army, *FM 3-05*, 2–2.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Colin S. Gray, "Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations Succeed?" *Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly* (Spring 1999): 9.

conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces."[64]

Due to the sensitive nature of the strategic decisions that SR impacts, and the associated requirement for secrecy, there is little doubt that SR is a special operation. The four most common types of SR are environmental, armed, target and threat, and post-strike. SR is critical to America's grand strategists as they work to develop and implement the various aspects of our national security strategy. Special reconnaissance is also of vital importance when the United States decides to take military action against a rogue state or non-state actor. One of the greatest failures of SR that I am aware of is the April 1961 debacle on Cuba's Zapata Peninsula, known as the Bay of Pigs Operation.

If the appropriate personnel had provided the appropriate type of SR, there is a very real possibility that President Kennedy would have never allowed the operation to take place. The basic concept was for the United States to land a group of Cuban exiles in a sparsely populated swamp to take control of and hold a beachhead until the Cuban population engaged in a spontaneous revolt against the Castro regime. The utter failure of the operation provides an important lesson regarding SR. In the words of Richard Bissell, the CIA officer responsible for planning the operation:

> It was rather lightheartedly assumed by the CIA that the swampy regions around the Bay of Pigs, while utterly different geographically from the mountains near Trinidad [previous invasion site] could support guerrilla operations. With hindsight, this assumption was highly questionable, and, in any event, was not carefully researched in the planning of the operation.[65]

Had U.S. forces conducted the appropriate environmental reconnaissance, the CIA would not have "mistakenly thought that the landing site was mostly deserted and that the exiles could land unnoticed.[66]" Nor would they have "missed the reefs at Blue

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[64] United States Department of Defense, *JP 3-05*, II–6.

[65] Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, *Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 32.

[66] Ibid., 49.

Beach, which caused the landing to fall behind schedule—leaving the hapless invasion fleet still offshore when Castro's aircraft struck."[67] It is impossible to say that, had the SR mission been given to ARSOF forces, the Bay of Pigs operation would have been a success. However, I can say with relative certainty that had detailed SR been conducted, major changes to the invasion plan would have been made that may well have led to a successful invasion.

It is not my intent to paint ARSOF-conducted SR as the panacea for all military problems but I do agree with the following excerpt from JP 3-05:

> Even with today's sophisticated long-range sensors and overhead platforms, some information can be obtained only by visual observation or other collection methods in the target area. SOF's highly developed capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile areas, worldwide communications, and specialized aircraft and sensors enable SR against targets inaccessible to other forces or assets.[68]

To end this discussion of UW, FID, and SR, my thoughts on the entire matter are these: SF exists for three primary purposes--to acquire information about America's enemies, to conduct operations with surrogate forces, and to provide training to foreign governments and militaries. Although ARSOF may be called to perform other missions, for example, CT as is the case today in Afghanistan, I think ARSOF needs to make it clear to itself and others where its strengths and advantages lie and where it represents "value added." I think the United States government will experience the greatest return on its investment when Army Special Operations Forces focus on the missions that led to their creation. Given the fact that our forces were created to perform UW, FID, and SR, we must strive to conduct these missions more than any other does during the next twenty years.

ADC: All right, Ops, I think you have convinced all of us. For the purposes of our briefing, DA is out; SR, FID, and UW are in. Now, what are your thoughts about the next group of core activities: CA, CT, PO, and IO?

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[67] Vandenbroucke, *Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, 49.

[68] United States Department of Defense, *JP-3-05*, II–6.

DOC: Before I became a doctor, I was a Civil Affairs NCO and I firmly believe that CA missions are special operations for a couple of reasons. In line with the definition of a special operation, CA personnel are specially organized and trained right here at Fort Bragg. The fact that CA missions "influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations"[69] leads me to believe they have a high degree of political sensitivity. Returning to the definition of a special operation, political sensitivity is one of the key factors that make a military operation special. There are also many cases where CA operations directly support UW and FID.

In an article published by the Joint Special Operations University Press, Herb Daniels, an SF Major, provides an excellent example of the nesting effect between FID and CA. Major Daniels participated in the Special Operations Task Force sent to the Philippines "to assist the government of the Philippines in its fight against the ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group) and JI (Jemaah Islamash) in the Sulu Archipelago."[70] MAJ Daniels' primary area of responsibility was the municipality of Talipao on the island of Jolo. He describes his operational environment this way:

> The team of U.S. advisors provided several capabilities to assist the AFP Battalion to include increased intelligence support, improved communications and tactical and technical training for combat operations. Because U.S. forces were strictly prohibited by the Philippine government from engaging in direct combat operations, their greatest weapon became humanitarian resources designed to improve the livelihood of the people on Jolo while at the same time giving the AFP/U.S. military personnel access to the local community.[71]

Based on the information above, it is easy to see that the success of the Jolo mission rested on MAJ Daniels' ability to influence the civilian population with a targeted civil affairs project that would meet a currently unfulfilled legitimate need.

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[69] United States Department of Defense, *JP-3-05*, GL–5.

[70] Major Herb Daniels, *Keeping COIN Simple: The Outhouse Strategy for Security Development* (Hurlburt Field: The JSOU Press, 2009), 2.

[71] Ibid.

The project had to involve the village leadership in its planning and execution, as well as the local AFP commander, who served as the Philippine central government's representative to the locality. The project needed to encourage community participation and be resourced by materials that could be secured locally. The complexity of the project had to be minimal so that all expertise could be obtained from the village or from villagers working in tandem with soldiers in the AFP/U.S. units. Most important, after the project's completion, the AFP/U.S. personnel needed to maintain continuous access to the village in order to ensure local support and to deter insurgent activity over time.[72]

The project that MAJ Daniels' team conducted in the village of Talipo, which earned the support of the local population, village leadership, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), was the construction of outhouses. These outdoor latrines came to fruition using materials left over from earlier projects, and ultimately an Islamic medical NGO underwrote a portion of the construction. The real value of the project manifested itself in two distinct ways. First, the villagers received infrastructure that they had been lacking for years and the level of hygiene skyrocketed. Second, because U.S. Soldiers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) built the outhouses along with laborers from the local villages, bonds of trust emerged between military members and the civilian population. Because of these bonds,

> The AFP battalion commander estimated that credible human intelligence on insurgent activity in Talipao was submitted to the battalion on a daily basis. Only a few months prior, the AFP had no sources in Talipao, but initial intelligence estimated that active members of ASG and JI passed through the municipality daily. Within the first month of the outhouse projects, AFP sources indicated that routine ASG and JI routes of movement were restricted to areas outside of the quickly expanding AFP influence in Talipao.[73]

Whether used to shape an operating environment in an area like Talipao caught in the middle of a low intensity, long duration insurgency, or to rebuild infrastructure and governmental operating capacity in a war torn country like Iraq, Civil Affairs operations are a critical component of the ARSOF inventory.

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[72] Daniels, *Keeping COIN Simple: The Outhouse Strategy for Security Development*, 6.

[73] Ibid., 9.

ADC: OK Doc, CA is in; what do you guys think about CT?

INTEL: Joint Publication 3-05 says that any offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism count as CT.[74] Maybe it's because I see it from a different point of view, but that definition actually tells me nothing. ARSOF are always conducting CT when executing UW, FID, or CA operations. Harkening back to the outhouse vignette, I can make a strong case that MAJ Daniels' team proactively countered terrorism on the island of Jolo by building those outhouses. My feeling is that CT, in the ARSOF community, is an endstate rather than a mission. ARSOF forces work toward the endstate of countering terrorism constantly through a myriad of missions, such as FID, CA, and PSYOP. It seems that the Center for New American Security agrees with my point when Michele Malvesti writes:

> Special Operations Forces can help prevent terrorism, for instance, by training and enabling the security forces of a vulnerable partner country, as well as by engaging the indigenous civilian population in order to identify critical local needs—all efforts that help build environments that are inhospitable to terrorists. They can help deter terrorists from acting or receiving critical support for their operations by disseminating information that challenges their violent ideological underpinnings and creates doubt among audiences regarding their causes and tactics.[75]

Countering terrorism is a goal that not only motivates the ARSOF community, but GPF as well. In fact, the current national security strategy directs the entire United States government to focus all efforts on countering terrorism. I do not believe that CT, as a mission separate and distinct from other ARSOF missions, is necessary because all the other ARSOF core tasks currently listed in FA 3-05 contribute to countering terrorism as a result of the overarching American focus on CT. The SOF Interagency

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[74] United States Department of Defense, *JP 3-05*, GL–6.

[75] Michele Malvesti, *Time for Action: Redefining SOF Missions and Activities* (Working Paper, Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2009), 4.

Counterterrorism Reference Manual says it best when it acknowledges, "that no single department, agency, or organization of the U.S. Government can, by itself, effectively locate and defeat terrorist networks, groups and individuals."[76]

OPS: Sir, I agree with you and JP 3-05 on the point that a myriad of missions have an impact on countering terror. However, I cannot envision a situation in which the National Command Authority would direct ARSOF to conduct a CT mission and our generals would respond by saying that since everything we do has an impact on CT that they are just going to deploy several teams to conduct SR and FID. Those generals would be immediately relieved and SOF would be directed to conduct CT operations. Yes, everything we do has an impact on countering terror but not all types of terrorist activity are countered by what we do. We market ourselves as an adaptable organization capable of conducting non-standard missions and then you make the case that CT shouldn't be a standalone mission. I do not agree with that stance because the undefined nature of what constitutes terrorism requires those attempting to counter it to maintain the greatest degree of adaptability possible.

INTEL: You make a salient point; rather than attempting to define CT into irrelevance, we should embrace it as a mission to which we are able to dedicate all ARSOF skills and abilities regardless of the form in which terror manifests itself. Thanks for helping me to see CT from such a new perspective.

ADC: Ok, it looks like we have reached an agreement on CT. The next topic for discussion is PSYOP.

OPS: Every time I drive along Son Tay Road here on Fort Bragg and I see those huge brand new PSYOP battalion headquarters buildings, I wonder what it is that those guys do. That thought is not just unique to me either, by the way; the G3 tells me that the CG spends a great deal of time wondering about the future of PSYOP as part of the ARSOF community.

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[76] Joint Special Operations University, *Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual* (Hurlburt Field, 2009), 1–1.

I know there is a great deal of misunderstanding in the community about PSOYP, so let's start with the definition in JP 3-05. Psychological Operations are:

> planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.[77]

Returning to the definition of a special operation, I believe political risk is at the center of what makes PSYOP a special operation. Having said that, I think it is of paramount importance to separate PSYOP as a type of special operation from the incorrect assumption that every mission conducted by members of the PSYOP branch is a special operation. For example, an MOS 37F PSYOP specialist broadcasting a surrender appeal or handing out leaflets in support of the Third Infantry Division in Baghdad does not constitute a special operation. Conversely, the same 37F broadcasting a surrender appeal or handing out leaflets in support of a Special Mission Unit conducting a covert raid in Iraq's Diyala province is conducting a special operation. The determining factor that makes the second example a special operation is the high degree of political risk associated with the covert raid.

Psychological operations conducted in countries that are not hostile in their attitude toward the United States are also special operations. For example, PSYOP soldiers task organized into a Military Information Support Team (MIST) supporting host nation efforts to delegitimize Al Qaeda networks and professionalize military and law enforcement personnel in Pakistan are conducting a special operation. In this case, and many others like it around the world, the PSYOP forces are working in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies in direct coordination with host nation entities on sensitive international issues. Because PSYOP missions meet these aspects of the definition, we should consider PSYOP a special operation.

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[77] United States Department of Defense, *JP 3-05*, GL–10.

ADC: Ok, so even though we generally see PSYOP as a special operation, we should not forget the delineation between special operations and GPF PSYOP missions. When we build our general profile of what we believe ARSOF professionals should look like, we should focus on the type of individual required to conduct Special Operations PSYOP. If we make the DCO and the boss understand this delineation between PSYOP missions, they will have the information they need to argue that the conventional army needs its own active component PSYOP capability outside of the 4th PSYOP Group. When the Army's GPF units have their own capability, our ARSOF PSYOP guys will be able to focus their efforts on PSYOP missions that are truly special operations.

PSYOP LTC Timothy D. Huening seems to agree. As he puts it in something he wrote recently, "inadequate staffing, resource constraints and a force imbalance coupled with a rising demand for PSYOP, either in MIST configurations or tactical support to the Brigade Combat Teams, complicates the understanding of PSYOP capabilities and limitations."[78]

OPS: So, it looks like our conclusion here is that PSYOP should be included in the ARSOF standalone mission set for the next twenty years with the caveat that not all PSYOP missions are special operations, and those that are not are better conducted by PSYOP personnel assigned to GPF units separate and distinct from USASOC. If that's what we're saying about PSYOP, then what about another routinely misunderstood mission set known as Information Operations?

ADC: I want to start with the definition of IO from the joint pub and then I want to compare it not only against the definition of a special operation but also against the IO capabilities resident in the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) before we make our final decision. The approved definition says that IO is "actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."[79] In Chapter II, the joint pub goes on to say that "defensive IO activities are conducted on a continuous basis and are an inherent part of

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[78] Lieutenant Colonel Timothy D. Huening, "Advancing the Art and Science of Psychological Operations Requires a Serious Investment," Small Wars Journal (2009), http://SmallWarsJournal.com.

[79] United States Department of Defense, *JP 3-05*, GL–7.

force employment across the range of military operations. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval."[80]

Using the definition of a special operation as a litmus test, this is how I assess the mission of Information Operations. I am laying this information out in a chart because my argument may appear counterintuitive and I want to make myself clear. Although I think that many IO activities qualify as special operations, I think that these missions are outside the purview of ARSOF. As I note in the chart, specially organized, trained, and equipped IO forces exist, but they exist as part of USSTRATCOM.

Evaluation Criteria	Special Operation	Remarks
Specially Organized Forces	Yes	Organized outside of ARSOF units
Specially Trained Forces	Yes	Trained in non-ARSOF /SOCOM programs
Specially Equipped Forces	Yes	Top Secret capabilities
Objectives Achieved by Unconventional Means	No	The capabilities are present in many non-ARSOF units
Conducted in Politically Sensitive Areas	Yes	
Conducted Across Range of Military Operations	Yes	
Conducted with Low Visibility Techniques	Yes	
Require National Level Oversight	Yes	

Table 1.   Assessment of Information Operations as a Special Operation

Claiming IO as part of the ARSOF domain creates levels of redundancy and confusion that simply are not necessary. Looking at the definition of IO again, actions taken to affect adversary information in support of special operations missions have been

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[80] United States Department of Defense, *JP 3-05*, II–11.

and should continue to remain under the control of our organic PSYOP personnel at the tactical and operational levels of war. If we ever find ourselves in a position that requires us to conduct offensive IO, in order to disable or destroy an adversary's information platform, we will have to conduct that through USSTRATCOM regardless of our organic capabilities and that is a strategic operation. If the target platform is internet-based, and almost all of them are these days, not even a geographical combatant commander has the authority to authorize an attack against it. Such an attack requires the review, nomination, and approval of a cyber Joint Interagency Task Force. What I am saying, basically, is that we will never own the authority for offensive IO. Nor will we own the personnel to conduct IO because they reside in either STRATCOM or the GPF. For these reasons, I do not think it is prudent for us to say that IO is a standalone ARSOF mission.

Also, in accordance with the joint pub definition, conducting defensive IO on a continual basis will force us to increase resource allocations to IO at the expense of other missions in much the same way as we have seen allocations to DA increase at the expense of FID and UW missions. My recommendation is that we leave IO to the three STRATCOM subordinates specifically trained, resourced, and networked to conduct it: the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC), the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), and the Joint Force Component Command-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW).

The JIOWC has over 200 personnel specifically trained to "enable Joint Force Commanders to plan and execute IO, both offensive and defensive involving the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), electronic warfare (EW), and computer network attack (CNA)/computer network defense (CND)."[81] In addition to the IO capabilities owned by the JIOWC, the 136 people who comprise JTF-GNO direct "the operation and defense of the Global Information Grid to assure timely and secure Net-Centric capabilities across strategic, operational, and tactical boundaries in support of DoD's full spectrum of war

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[81] United States Strategic Command, "Fact Sheets: Joint Information Operations Warfare Center," U.S. Strategic Command Fact Sheets, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/jiowc/Joint_Information_Operations_Warfare_Command/.

fighting, intelligence, and business missions."[82] JFCC-NW is a little known component of USSTRATCOM responsible for the passive monitoring of, and offensive action against, enemy information platforms that utilize the internet. It is interesting to note that the director of JFCC-NW also serves as the director of the National Security Agency (NSA), which is one of the best IO agencies in the entire world.

At this point, I hope it's clear just how intimately involved USSTRATCOM and the NSA are with conducting IO. I would also like to point out that JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW are merging to create a four-star level, sub-unified U.S. Cyber Command this year. I feel that all of this information makes the argument that, IO is a mission set best managed and conducted outside the scope of USASOC.

DOC: The final mission that we need to review is CP, but as we do so we must remember that the vast majority of ARSOF's CP tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are classified. CP refers to actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover WMD."[83] Both JP 3-05 and Army FM 3-05 are quite vague in their discussions of CP, so I dug into Joint Publication 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction looking for a bit more information. This document, along with JP 3-05, discusses Special Operations capabilities regarding CP in the vein of interdicting the ability of terrorist networks to obtain WMD. The degree of physical and political risk encountered by ARSOF personnel conducting CP operations easily marks it as a special operation, and the fact that failure to dedicate any assets and skills that we own to the CP fight could result in the destruction of our entire country requires that we classify CP as an ARSOF mission.

INTEL: I think we need to have a robust discussion regarding the relevance of CP as a special operation. However, doing so requires us to move into a classified venue. The next time we attend a classified update, let's stay behind and talk CP.

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[82] United States Strategic Command, "Fact Sheets: Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations," U.S. Strategic Command Fact Sheets, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/gno/Joint_Task_Force_-_Global_Network_Operations/.

[83] United States Department of Defense, *JP 3-05*, II–10.

ADC: Gentlemen, pending the classified discussion, we have completed our review of what doctrine calls the nine ARSOF core missions, and we have agreed on the ones that we should classify as a standalone mission. Now, let's take a moment and review what we have determined. For the purposes of defining the type of ARSOF professionals necessary to conduct special operations for the next couple of decades, we are recommending that the following ARSOF missions be maintained without further caveat: UW, SR, CA, and FID. We believe that some, but not all, PSYOP activities are ARSOF missions. Additionally, we are recommending that DA and IO are eligible for deletion as standalone missions for the next twenty years. Does anyone have any problem with these recommendations? Does anyone think there are any missions that we should add to the list?

INTEL: I would like to address security force assistance (SFA). I know this emerging mission has the attention of the Secretary of Defense and I think it is a mission that we should add separate and distinct from FID. The niche for SFA missions is the space between the end of stability operations, of which FID is a part, and State Department diplomatic operations. A recent report from the Army's Strategic Studies Institute describes SFA operations in the following manner:

> According to the DoD's draft instruction on relationships and responsibilities for SFA, it is defined as: (1) operations, actions, or activities that contribute to unified action to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions; (2) the bolstering of a foreign security force or institution's capabilities or capacity in order to facilitate the achievement of specific operational objectives shared with the USG.[84]

I understand SFA to be operations that are advisory in nature and conducted at the strategic and political levels of government, much like those that Colonel Edward Geary Lansdale conducted in the Philippines during the 1950s. The objective in a FID mission is for American troops to advise successfully some component of the host nation's (HN) security force. As I understand the Army's definition of SFA, its focus is on the

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[84] Lieutenant Colonel Theresa Baginski et al., *A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 2.

governmental institutions that support the HN security forces. Advising the HN civilians who run the executive level agencies charged with national defense and security is an area of paramount importance to the United States government. America's current National Military Strategy (NMS) focuses on the ability of U.S. forces to "facilitate the integration of military operations with allies, contribute to regional stability, reduce underlying conditions that foment extremism and set the conditions for future success."[85] I think the NMS provides ample justification for the conduct of SFA outside the parameters of FID.

As I mentioned earlier, Colonel Lansdale is an excellent example of an SFA advisor. He was an advisor to Ramon Magsaysay, the Philippine secretary of national defense. Utilizing little more than his innate charm and uncanny wile, Lansdale developed tremendous personal chemistry with Magsaysay. The personal relationship between Lansdale and Magsaysay enabled Lansdale, a military officer, to serve as an advisor to a civilian on how to use to his military; Lansdale was not a direct military advisor, per se. The real magic to the relationship was the fact that Magsaysay was comfortable enough to speak with his guard down and float outside- the- box ideas to Lansdale without fear of losing face. Their relationship ultimately resulted in the resounding defeat of the Huk communist rebellion in the Philippines, and the election of the pro-American Magsaysay as the President of the Philippines.[86]

Introducing U.S. military advisors with the ability to effectively advise HN civilian leaders, just as Lansdale was able to do, shows there is no better way to "improve the capabilities of allies and other partners, as well as the quality of the relationship between the United States and such partners."[87] Certainly, the ARSOF community contains some professionals with the ability to advise HN civilian leaders. In addition to the fact that many of our guys are excellent advisors because of their UW and FID

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[85] United States Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C., 2004), 12.

[86] For more information on the relationship between Landsdale and Magsaysay, reference: Lansdale, Edward Geary. *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991).

[87] Baginski et al., *A Comprehensive Approach*, 5.

experiences, SFA should be considered an ARSOF mission because HN capacity building in conjunction with America's national security objectives carries a significant degree of political sensitivity and a large amount of national level oversight. Unlike members of GPF units, ARSOF guys are trained for and routinely conduct missions that are politically risky and heavily scrutinized by the international community. I think it makes sense to include SFA as an ARSOF mission because our guys are educated, in the classroom and on the job, to conduct SFA-like missions.

ADC: Intel, from the nods I see around the table, you made a compelling case. Now, let's take a look at the skills and abilities that we think ARSOF professionals need to effectively prosecute the ARSOF mission set.

INTEL: While we were reviewing the missions, I wrote down the key aspects of each mission we agreed on because I think these aspects will help us identify the type of professionals that ARSOF will need to conduct the missions. What I wrote down looks like this:

ARSOF Required Capabilities:	
Operate independently	Develop, manage, discover, and interdict networks
Explain and promote U.S. national interests	Bolster HN capacity
Assist foreign and domestic civil authorities	Identify and address causes of instability
Operate in politically sensitive environments	Influence behavior
Synthesize and leverage the political and informational dimensions of an operational environment	

Table 2.   Required Capabilities for the ARSOF Operator

What I take from our discussion thus far is that the ARSOF professional is someone who "discerns new insights of the battlespace, develops responsive plans, and applies innovative, unexpected operational or organizational solutions to accomplish mission objectives."[88]

DOC: Sir, based on your list of capabilities and the recent finding that "SOF leaders do not believe that they are sufficiently prepared to operate at national policy, strategic, and theater operational levels,"[89] wouldn't we say ARSOF needs to do a better job attracting, educating, and retaining leaders who can develop strategic estimates, as well as strategic appreciation?

OPS: Sure, that's great Doc. But, what does that mean?

DOC: The USSOCOM Strategy 2010 says that:

> Strategic Appreciation goes beyond mere data, information, and knowledge. By applying perception, perspective, culture, history, and geography we try to achieve a higher level of *understanding*—not simply what and how events occur but rather *why*. This appreciation concentrates on relationships and synthesis of information rather than data and threats. Whereas a strategic *estimate* is an assessment of conditions against a baseline or plan, a strategic appreciation incorporates the understanding of the geostrategic context.[90]

I know that it's difficult to delineate between an estimate and an appreciation but I think that ARSOF should further clarify that a strategic estimate represents the union of three components: becoming aware of information, grasping the meaning of that information, and assessing that information against a set of evaluation criteria. Strategic appreciation, on the other hand, is achieved via the confluence of understanding, synthesis, and leverage. An ARSOF professional with a high degree of strategic appreciation has the ability to comprehend the primary impacts, implications, and ramifications various stimuli have on individuals, groups, and systems, as well as the

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[88] Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., *Joint Special Operations University Educational Requirements Analysis for Academic Years 2005–2010* (McLean: Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., 2005), 16.

[89] Ibid., ES7.

[90] United States Special Operations Command, *U.S. Special Operations Command Strategy 2010* (Tampa: United States Special Operations Command, 2009), A2–A3.

ability to predict accurately the secondary and tertiary effects of the stimuli within a relevant context. In order for ARSOF professionals to achieve success in the missions we have identified, they must be able to develop strategic estimates *and* strategic appreciation. I believe we can deal with the nuances of developing strategic appreciation in the coming weeks but, for now, I am relatively sure that we have established a baseline profile for the ARSOF professional of the future.

ADC: Gentlemen, we have arrived at a point where we need to prepare a short summary for the DCO to ensure that we keep him apprised of what we're doing and the direction we are headed. Based on our work over the last week or so, let's give the DOC a couple slides as our IPR number two. While he is reviewing our work on this portion of the project, we will move on to dealing with the third question: how could we structure an ARSOF education system that resources our professionals with the competencies that you identify? Go get started on the weekend while I e-mail our update slides to the DCO.

> **To: DCO, USASOC**
> **From: Aide-de-Camp**
> **Subject: PME Working Group #2**
>
> Sir,
>
> Please review the working group's IPR #2 summary slides below; slide one is our recommended ARSOF standalone mission set, slide two portrays the competencies we think ARSOF professionals should possess in order to successfully accomplish the proposed mission set.
>
> V/R
> ADC

Add	Delete (as Standalone)
SFA: • "Facilitate the integration of military operations with allies, contribute to regional stability, reduce underlying conditions" (2004 National Military Strategy) • Our niche is the gap between the end of military stability operations (FID) and United States government diplomatic engagements	**DA:** • Significantly detracts from proposed missions • Ranger Regiment, JSOC, NAVSPECWAR have DA expertise **IO:** • Subject matter expertise belong to a conventional STRATCOM • Adding IO to the ARSOF domain creates levels of redundancy and confusion

Proposed Mission Set for Standalone Missions

Maintain	Maintain with Caveat
UW: • Critical given the emergence of non-state actors and the rise in politically unstable and under-governed areas **SR:** • Strategic intelligence requirements in support of diplomatic engagements, deterrence operations, and covert/clandestine operations required to protect American interests **CA:** • Expected rise in requirements to augment UW and FID operations by meeting legitimate needs of target populations across the spectrum of conflict **FID:** • ARSOF niche in stability operations (FM 3-05)	**PO:** • CAVEAT: Not all operations conducted by PSYOP personnel are ARSOF missions • ARSOF should maintain control of missions with a high degree of political risk and those conducted in direct support of other ARSOF missions **CT:** • Constant morphing of "terrorism" necessitates inclusion along with recognition that all missions have an impact on countering terrorism **CP:** • Pending detailed conversation at the classified level

Figure 6.   Proposed Mission Sets

Figure 7.   ARSOF Competencies

C.   ARSOF EDUCATION FRAMEWORK

ADC: Given the roles and missions we have discussed, what do you guys think about the ARSOF education process?

DOC: As a psychologist, I have the chance to talk to quite a few PSYOP, CA, and SF officers and NCOs; the two words I hear most are flexibility and adaptability. Senior leaders tell me they are looking for team and company guys that possess these qualities; team and company guys tell me these two qualities have the greatest impact on successful mission accomplishment regardless of deployment location.

INTEL: I couldn't agree more; in fact, I was talking to a mentor of mine that now works in the Pentagon's office of Net Assessment, about PME, and he turned me on to a study that his office conducted in 2003. I found the summary of the conference report he sent me profound in its simplicity. Generally, the result of this particular study pointed out that it was crucial to discover a way to have military officers inculcate an appreciation for adaptability and flexibility from their first day of commissioned service. The study went on to make the following point.

> Officers have to be comfortable with thinking in terms of the art of the possible. They must be able to take in multiple points of view and different perspectives. Above all, they must be sensitive to context, and must be attuned to the fact that positioning is everything.[91]

I think this is the correct philosophy to guide ARSOF's thinking about PME for everyone regardless of rank or duty position. One of the major takeaways from the conference was that those "who will be our senior leaders in 2030 not only have to have strategic vision, but recognize on their own when someone else's vision is needed."[92]

I agree with the conference folks and I would like to see a PME curriculum that educates ARSOF professionals on the topics of strategy and operational art at every rank while continually reinforcing tactical training. Waiting until the Army War College to address strategic thinking and planning seems too late to me. We hear a lot about tactical actions having strategic effects but I don't think the current PME structure does a very good job of helping guys grasp the concepts that comprise strategic theory. I think we should explore the possibility of teaching strategy, operational art, and tactics concurrently as opposed to the accepted PME structure that begins with tactical training and mechanically evolves into strategy-based education for a select few. ARSOF strategic education should "distinguish between intellect and character / personality. . . Any strategically educable person should have their capacity for sound and perhaps superior strategic judgment improved by intense exposure to the small cannon of classic

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[91] United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Net Assessments, *The Military Officer in 2030* (Unpublished Summary Presentation, Newport, 2003). Slide #43.

[92] Ibid., Slide #86.

texts on general strategic theory"[93] and I think that judgment can be improved at all grade levels if the community is willing to support several changes to the ARSOF education system.

OPS: Gentlemen, I understand and appreciate what our senior civilian leaders and Washington-based working groups have to say about ARSOF PME; however, we also need to consider what our customer units have to say about the performance levels and educational shortfalls of our people.

ADC: I am glad you brought that up; I do a lot of reading and summarizing for the CG and I have several excerpts that provide anecdotal summaries of the main arguments by branch (CA, PSYOP, and SF) for considering changes to the current PME structure. In a 2009 U.S. Army War College Monograph, LTC Miguel Castellanos surveyed his War College peers to gain a perspective from former Battalion Commanders and staff officers who commanded or worked alongside CA forces in OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) and OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom).[94] Castellanos notes the following in his analysis:

> Another shortfall noted was the inability for CATs to provide functional specialty capabilities, specifically in governance, rule of law, economic stability (agriculture) and infrastructure (water and electricity). Conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq both exuded vast societal and infrastructure challenges, which fostered instability and security concerns. Subject Matter Experts adequately capable of responding to problems, develop solutions [sic] and commit resources [sic] were few and far between.[95]

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, the former Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, who is now serving as the Interim Director for National Strategic Studies at the National

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[93] Colin S. Gray, *Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), v–vi.

[94] Lieutenant Colonel Miguel A. Castellanos, *Civil Affairs—Building The Force to Meet Its Future Challenges* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 9.

[95] Ibid., 15.

Defense University (NDU), characterizes PSYOP shortcomings in much the same way Castellanos does those in the CA community. In a 2005 PSYOP-focused NDU publication, Dr. Lamb writes:

> A recurrent complaint throughout the operations reviewed by this study concerns the quality of psychological operations products. Specifically, according to both the JFCOM and 4th POG lessons learned, CENTCOM leaders were unhappy with the quality, timeliness, and sophistication of PSYOP products.[96]

Finally, take a look at the competency model I found in the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Educational Requirements Analysis.[97] It contains the best information I've seen supporting the argument for an amended ARSOF PME model.

Figure 8.   Joint SOF Leadership Competency Model

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[96] Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, *Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2005), 101.

[97] For detailed review of the analysis, please see Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., *Joint Special Operations University,* 16.

The JSOU-commissioned study presents the results of a SOCOM-wide survey seeking to show how the four service component special operations organizations (ARSOF, NAVSPECWAR, AFSOC, and MARSOC) rank their own level of proficiency according to the twenty-four competencies that comprise the Joint SOF Competency Model. The ARSOF respondents assessed themselves as having mastered the four competencies of team building, people development, problem solving, and initiative. What I found interesting is the fact that the respondents assessed themselves at much lower levels of proficiency when it came to competencies that support the four they describe as "mastering." ARSOF respondents graded themselves as operating at the performing level[98] with regard to the following six competencies: joint and combined warfighting, asset management, strategic art, technology management, resource management, and joint C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). Of the six parent categories JSOU uses to group the twenty-four competencies in their model, the lowest ratings provided by ARSOF respondents correspond to the parent categories of vision and strategy, force application, and force management. These self-identified weaknesses become even more glaring when you factor in a study conducted five years prior to the JSOU survey. In discussing the U.S. Army Special Forces Command Field Survey 2000, administered to all active-duty SF soldiers, the authors note "enlisted A-detachment leadership rated recent SFQC graduates as least proficient in the attributes of judgment and planning, autonomy, adaptability, maturity and language."[99] Although the weaknesses of the four studies I've just described do not correspond 100%, they speak to the overarching theme that the current ARSOF education system requires some amending to ensure our

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[98] The JSOU study defines performing in the following manner: Individual demonstrates general ability in this area. Individual can perform some complex tasks with minimal guidance and simple tasks independently. Individual is able to contribute knowledge or ideas in this [the assessed competency] area (page 20).

[99] Dr. Michelle M. Zazanis et al., "SF Pipeline Review: Voices from the Field," *Special Warfare* (2000): 6.

operators, regardless of duty assignment, are prepared to excel across the myriad of defense, diplomacy, and development activities that occur in a whole-of-government approach.[100]

INTEL: I think the ADC has captured the essence of the argument that ARSOF leaders are making—based on our recent operational experiences, ARSOF as an organization needs to change the way it educates its officers and NCOs. I think the best way to do that is to follow Richard Downie's aphorism that to learn from an experience, an organization must first act to interpret, evaluate, and accept the lessons learned by individual organizational members and then make the decision to adapt organizational behavior to this new knowledge and transmit it throughout the organization.[101] What we need to do is come up with what we think is the educational model that will best prepare ARSOF Soldiers to fill the roles and execute the missions we have discussed thus far.

OPS: Yes sir, and if there is any way to do so, I'd like our group to propose a framework that will change with the operational environment. I can't tell you how many working groups I have been a part of over the years where all we did was react to some event by making a short-term procedural change without planning for a long-term organizational or cultural shift. I understand that we will never get it exactly right but I do think we should do our best to propose a framework that we won't have to revamp in two years.

INTEL: Regardless of the model, system, or program we come up with, it must speak to individual and organizational flexibility and adaptability just as Doc said a few minutes ago. Granted, most of the time we deploy as teams, but the teams are comprised of individuals and, at some point, people rotate off teams and end up like us—serving in staff positions, or possibly serving as subject matter experts or advisors in places like Washington, D.C., Kabul, Baghdad, or Bogotá, just to name a few. Our model must

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[100] United States Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command Strategic Plan* (Tampa, 2009), 8.

[101] Richard D. Downie, *Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 24.

capture the quintessence of what LTC Christopher Gehler describes in his War College thesis. I think his analysis is pertinent enough for you to indulge me while I quote him at length:

> Learning is both an individual and organizational phenomenon. Researchers have defined experiential learning as a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills or procedures as a result of observation and interpretation of experience. This learning happens at the individual cognitive level. Organizations, though often thought of as an organism with goals, beliefs, and memories, do not and cannot learn in the same way. Organizations learn through the experiences of their individual members by encoding these experiential lessons learned into organizational norms and routines. This is a widely accepted perspective advanced by Argyris and Schon, Heclo, and Hedberg. Organizations learn from experiences to the extent that member experiences are assimilated into various organizational policies, doctrines, and procedures. The research describes a multi-stage process in which environmental feedback leads to individual learning, which leads to individual action to change organizational procedures, which leads to change in organizational behavior, which leads to further feedback.[102]

DOC: I'd like to see an ARSOF PME model that dovetails with the SF, PSYOP, and CA qualification courses. I think the program should contain three phases that students move through over the course of their entire career. Following graduation from one of the three ARSOF qualification courses, my vision is that students would transition out of the first phase following successful completion of a complement of courses introducing them to the differences between GPF and ARSOF organizations and cultures. Officers, Warrant Officers, and NCOs would transition from the second to the third phase upon promotion to Colonel, Chief Warrant Officer Five, or Sergeant Major. However, guys that don't get selected for those promotions would not be penalized and they would continue to be educated and employed according to their performance in the second phase of the program.

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[102] Lieutenant Colonel Christopher P. Gehler, *Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating Adaptive and Innovative Leaders for Today and Tomorrow* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 5.

ADC: I think we should base the PME structure on several broad themes that will guide the education occurring during all three of the phases that Doc suggests. The SOCOM Strategic Plan for implementing the Stragey 2010 discusses three focus areas and seven objectives that will drive special operations planning and development for the next twenty years.[103]

FOCUS AREAS

1. The Operator

2. Enabling Capabilities, Capacities, and Authorities

3. Strategic Influence

OBJECTIVES

1. Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces

2. Address Opportunities and Challenges to National Security

3. Inform the National Decision-Making Process through Joint Staff to OSD

4. Provide Strategic Guidance and Priorities to Components

5. Support Defense, Diplomacy, and Development (3-D) Whole-of-Government Approaches to Enhanced National Security

6. Deter, Disrupt, and Defeat Violent Extremist Threats To the Nation

7. Integrate and Develop Capabilities in Assigned Responsibilities

Figure 9.   USSOCOM Strategic Plan Focus Areas and Objectives

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[103] For a detailed description of the focus areas and objectives, please see SOCOM Strategic Plan, December 18, 2009.

I extrapolated eight broad themes from the focus areas and objectives for the plan that I presented to the CG. I think the following themes would be excellent topics around which to build educational curricula:

- Organizational Design
- Strategy and Policy
- Doctrine, Authorities
- The Global Synchronization Process
- Major Force Program-11 (MPF-11) Capabilities
- Developing and managing Operational Narratives
- Coordination and Integration.

Intel: I want us to make sure that the PME model we recommend supports and aligns with the skills and knowledge requirements of the jobs graduates will fill immediately following their education. Frequently, people are educated to develop relationships during utilization tours but they wind up filling positions that do not require them to analyze information gathered by others, which necessitates a different skill set and knowledge base. Just as logisticians must understand and support the operational plan, our PME program must produce graduates who can meet operational needs. To the greatest degree possible, the PME system we propose must educate ARSOF professionals who fit the strategic context, the requirements of customer units like TSOCs, and the needs of the force providing units and deployed teams.

OPS: Our concept of PME should make it clear that, just because some of us aren't promoted to Colonel, Chief Warrant Officer Five or Sergeant Major or selected for service as a commander or command sergeant major, ARSOF education is a career-long process. Thinking back to the competency slide that the ADC e-mailed us as part of IPR #2, I believe we should recommend a model that allows for two distinct educational tracks. As depicted in IPR #2 Slide #2, the two tracks should focus on the development of relational and analytical competencies. Doing so will allow for two things. First, if a team sergeant determines that one of his guys can't comprehend what's going on during a deployment, the ARSOF PME structure must give him the assurance that when the team returns to home station, the team sergeant can get his guy into classes with a heavy focus

on analytical competencies. Second, building two separate tracks will also give our senior leaders the flexibility to direct NCOs and officers to a specific track based on their demonstrated potential for a command billet or nominative assignment.

DCO: Pardon me for interrupting guys, but I stuck my head in a few minutes ago to see how things were progressing and your discussion caught my attention. The one thing I have yet to hear is a discussion of senior leader education. I'd like to give you my thoughts regarding executive education, which I assume will take place during the third phase of your proposed model. When it comes to executive managers, and that's what ARSOF professionals at my level are, I think one of the most underutilized ways for them to remain relevant is through routine education. People at my level are the ones determining the themes that your working group believes should undergird the entire ARSOF PME system. Any PME model that's implemented without a well informed plan for senior leader discussions regarding the educational themes, processes, and assessment variables are necessary to produce the best possible ARSOF officers and NCOs will be sub-optimal. Mandating ARSOF-specific executive-level education as a part of your PME structure will ensure that senior leaders routinely come together in an academic environment to think about the future of our organization and the development of its component people according to your framework. I'd appreciate it if you gentlemen include my thoughts in your model. I look forward to your next update and I am now out the door to my next meeting.

ADC: I think I have a good idea of what everyone would like to see included in a career-long ARSOF education and utilization framework—let's call it an early day. I have duty this weekend and that will give me the perfect opportunity to create a slide that pulls everything we talked about today together. Monday morning we can look at the slide, discuss a couple different ways we could implement such a framework, and wrap up by identifying the possible impacts all of this could have on the way that USASOC presently operates.

D.   ARSOF EDUCATION-UTILIZATION MODEL

**ADC:** Good morning guys; here is what I mapped out over the weekend.

Figure 10.   ARSOF Career-Long Education-Utilization Model

ADC: I think the processes outlined in this slide convey the ideas that we discussed last week. The things I like best about our model are that it supports SOCOM's themes and objective; it allows for the education of individuals who can be task organized and utilized in countless combinations; and it predicates itself on the understanding that strategic and operational contexts, mission requirements, and preferences will change over time.

INTEL: I like the way we have configured the developmental block to serve as an ARSOF basic course. I think it was a wise decision to use the focus areas and implementation tasks from the SOCOM Strategic Plan to provide the curricular boundaries for our new operators as they transition from their qualification courses to their first ARSOF units.

OPS: Yes sir, I think it's a great idea to bring our new guys into the classroom for an introduction to the intricacies of the special operations community before sending

them off to JSOTFs, Embassies, and to work as part of the Interagency process. I think the themes listed in the developmental block are both broad and specific enough to frame the entire USASOC educational system regardless of phase. However, for this phase to work, everyone must attend the basic course. The day we start allowing operators to waive this phase in deference to short-term operational needs, we will have undermined the developmental process.

ADC: One of the major selling points of ARSOF developmental education via a basic course is that we are introducing our new folks to a unique internal culture right about the time they will have completed extensive cultural and language education in preparation for service in one of the TSOC areas of responsibility. Although the following thought from BG(R) Howard speaks to service in the cultures of foreign nations, I think it also applies very well to a new operator's introduction to the world of ARSOF.

> It is impossible to learn the vagaries of every disparate culture a Special Forces operator will face in a career. However, it is possible to learn the macro fundamentals of culture so that a Special Forces operator knows which questions to ask and what pitfalls to avoid before engaging those from a particular culture.[104]

As I am sure everyone in this room is aware, successfully navigating the SOF culture, both inside USASOC and throughout SOCOM, is oftentimes the hardest part of the job.

DOC: I understand the thought behind this phase of our model and I understand the themes that we think should drive ARSOF education across all three phases. However, I am having a hard time understanding the assessment variables and their relationship with the utilization period. Can you help me understand the linkages?

ADC: Think about it this way, we are serving in a utilization period any time we are not in an educational billet, such as Intermediate Level Education at Fort Leavenworth, the Training with Industry program, or the Sergeant Majors' Academy.

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[104] Brigadier General (ret.) Russell D. Howard, *Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environment* (Hurlburt Field: The JSOU Press, 2009), 31.

The assessment variables are what the USASOC HQ folks tasked with responding to requests for forces and managing assignments should use to ensure that our people are educated to accomplish the tasks they will face after they complete whatever phase of the educational process they are in. Further, the assessment variables help raters and senior raters evaluate officers and NCOs while they are serving in a utilization period. By directing them to the educational track that will be the most beneficial to USASOC as an organization during that individual's next utilization period, we ensure the best possible fit. For example, an SF officer that shows a penchant for operational analysis while assigned as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) liaison officer in Brussels should be considered for attendance to the Naval Postgraduate School's Operations Research department, through which he would earn a fully accredited master's degree in his area of interest. Following his graduation, he could be utilized in a highly complex Special Operations research and analysis position. Allowing such an education-utilization process to take place ensures that the right person is assigned to the right job and the wrong person is not.

To echo Army Regulation 600-100, "as leaders progress through the levels, their assignments become more complex and interdependent, and require more responsibility, accountability, and authority."[105] For this reason, the USASOC educational development model must base itself on outputs. The most pertinent USASOC outputs are SOF operators who possess the competencies required by the current context, supported organizations, and the network of associated preferences as determined by the assessment variables in our model.

INTEL: Doc, the aide is right. The ARSOF community needs to inculcate a few broad assessment variables that will allow our commanders, staffs, and doctrine managers to educate and utilize officers and NCOs in a way that will maximize efficiency and mission accomplishment. The best thing about the assessment variables is that they are useable by evaluators in both the educational *and* operational realms.

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[105] United States Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 600-100 Army Leadership* (Washington, D.C., 2007), 3.

OPS: Gentlemen, I appreciate the need for assessment variables and how to use them, but we also need to clarify the thought process behind the assessment variables.

ADC: The ever-changing requirements of ARSOF customers will drive the ways in which the variables are used. For example, when an American Ambassador requests a PSYOP team to help his host nation develop an anti-terrorism campaign, his personal paradigm, to a large degree, determines who is (and sometimes who is not) deployed to support the request. When ODB commanders submit mid-tour AARs, they note competency shortfalls that should be used to adjust the ARSOF education system, and equally important, which operators and teams are deployed to execute the mission during the next team rotation.

OPS: Now that I understand how customer-based requirements influence the utilization period, I think we can also state that ARSOF operators' performance-based reputations are extremely important. Operator reputations have a direct impact on their education and utilization during the functional phase. Along with their demonstrated potential for future performance, operators' reputations will have a direct impact on the type and frequency of future assignments.

ADC: You're right, and since a large portion of our community will spend most of their careers in this phase, I think it's important for us to recommend that educational coursework during this phase meet most of the professional development requirements outlined in Department of the Army Pamphlets 600-25 and 600-3.[106] If the CG approves our model, we will obviously need to discuss it with the USASOC doctrine developers and personnel managers before it will be ready for the staffing process. When we lay out our implementation recommendations, we should discuss the need for future working groups to study the impacts of this phase on current officer and NCO education systems. For instance, should the curricula derived from our model replace, augment or align with ILE, BNCOC, ANCOC, and the warrant officer basic and advanced courses?

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[106] DA Pam 600-25 is the Army's NCO Professional Development Guide and DA Pam 600-3 is the Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management publication. These documents provide detailed information regarding the Army's current educational requirements and career progression models for non-commissioned, warrant, and commissioned officers.

INTEL: I know answering those questions will require additional working groups and meetings, but one thing I am certain of right now is that ARSOF senior leaders will have to foment a cultural shift to make sure that individuals who never reach the executive-level education phase do not encounter a false perception that they have failed to achieve career success.

DOC: I'd like to offer a thought about our model. As I listened to you summarize the developmental and functional blocks, I wondered how we were going to characterize the executive-level education block without opening ourselves up to criticism for having no experience at the senior executive level. I realize the value of executive-level education, outside of preparing individual senior leaders for their utilization assignments, is the way that ARSOF senior executives review and refine the themes, assessment variables, and competency requirements along with the overarching protocols that govern the career-long development process. I feel confident in saying that some flag officers may question the model because they won't think senior leaders should be beholden to specific educational wickets; if we make sure to present the executive-level education block as the phase that governs the previous two, we may be able to preclude such criticism.

ADC: Speaking of precluding criticism, there are two more issues we need to address: why our model doesn't address language education or tactical training.

OPS: We can address the lack of tactical training in the model by reinforcing the fact that education provides our operators with hard to quantify intellectual modalities, while training focuses on the enrichment of easily quantifiable skills, such as marksmanship, conducting airborne operations, or physical fitness training. I think we address this issue by pointing out that force-providing units will continue to conduct training at their level just as they have always done. I believe commanders, sergeants major, and first sergeants will be open to our proposals when they hear that we have no desire to encroach on their unit training plans.

INTEL: When it comes to language education, I think the solution lies in Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) rather than the ARSOF PME. Rather than spending millions of dollars attempting to educate the majority of the ARSOF population to speak one of a dozen national languages with an additional dozen regional dialects, I think it would be easier to recruit individuals who already possess the language skills that our future missions will require. The myriad of intelligence reports I read all agree that it's impossible to predict the future, so rather than having to restructure a language education program as contexts change and contingencies emerge, I think language education as a current component of the existing SF, CA, and PO qualification courses should be maintained.

DOC: Thinking about your comment that the SORB may hold the solution to ARSOF's language problem, I agree that it's probably easier to recruit people with the language skills we need, and I see a role for our model in that process. As the senior sergeants major work through the assessment variable validation process, specifically the customer unit requests and the preferences of the deployed teams, I guarantee you that shortfalls in language capabilities will emerge. At that point, the sergeants major could pass the requirements to the SORB, which could then begin surveying the entire Army in an attempt to identify and recruit people who already possess the required capabilities. I know this is a provocative idea and I also know that a detailed discussion of language education is outside the scope of this working group; however, in the future, we do need to address the absence of language education from our model.

OPS: I agree with you Doc, and I would finish the language argument with a twist on an often-quoted SOF truth.[107] It is impossible to create language-competent special operations forces after emergencies occur. Knowing this, I would agree with Doc's assessment that the best way to deal with the language question is by showing how our model supports the identification of language requirements.

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[107] The SOF truths are: (1) Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur; (2) Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced; (3) quality is better than quantity; and, (4) humans are more important than hardware. United States Army Special Operations Command, "SOF Truths," Special Operations Command, http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/truths.html.

INTEL: Now that we have addressed the components that make up our model, as well as the components that we left out, let's address possible ways that our model could be implemented.

ADC: The first recommendation that we could make is that USASOC create a SOF University to implement and manage our model separate and distinct from the traditional leader development of the Army's GPF.

INTEL: As we introduce this recommendation, we will have to recognize and state that it would be a monumental undertaking, because it would create a schism between the GPF and ARSOF. The good news is that there are ways to overcome the negative responses to this recommendation.

ADC: The overarching positive associated with the establishment of an ARSOF University is that it provides our senior leaders with the flexibility required to allow the strategic context and emerging competency requirements to shape a career-long ARSOF educational strategy.

OPS: The ideal ARSOF University would provide normalizing ARSOF-focused education to all qualification course graduates as a group before newly minted operators arrive at their units. In the functional phase, I see the university providing branch and MOS-specific education through coursework tailored to support current demands and emerging trends.

DOC: I would go so far as to recommend that the university establish departments to teach all the aspects of Special Operations, as well as, an additional department to provide the education necessary for our guys that need to complete schools like ILE and ANCOC.

ADC: That is a great idea Doc. I think it makes a compelling argument to suggest that the ARSOF University should organize itself much like the Defense Analysis (DA) department at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). NPS is the SOCOM-funded joint educational school that currently provides premier Special Operations PME, as well as accredited graduate degrees to officers and warrant officers who complete the DA program.

INTEL: Now that we have broached the topic of Joint Special Operations PME, the second recommendation we could offer would require support from outside the ARSOF community. Because the nature of SOF operations is inherently joint, what about recommending that USSOCOM's JSOU implement and manage our education-utilization model for the entire Joint Special Operations Force?

ADC: Sir, your recommendation is one that I support. Just a few weeks ago, I participated in a SOCOM working group during which we discussed the nature of SOF capabilities required for future operations. When we recommend asking SOCOM to manage the entire process through JSOU, I want us to make sure that we bring up the idea of JSOU transforming itself into a university organized into two mutually supporting subsidiaries. First, JSOU must contain an element dedicated to education along the lines we proposed in our previous recommendation. Second, they should have a "think tank" branch responsible for developing Special Operations theory and pushing it out to the entire SOCOM community, as well as the JSOU's education branch.[108]

DOC: Although the consolidation of resources is good, this recommendation will only be palatable if it allows each Service component to retain the management of several Service-specific courses that will be mandatory for its operators. Doing this will keep Special Operators apprised of developments in their Service specific components, thus arming them for success in their parent Service, as well as the Joint SOF environment.

OPS: It sounds like implementing this recommendation would result in the creation of a Special Operations knowledge center that would create SOF doctrine and teach it all under the auspices of a single four-star headquarters. This idea is appealing because it will synergize SOF efforts into a single command, yet it will allow each Service component to maintain a degree of autonomy through the mandatory course requirements that Doc just mentioned. I like it!

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[108] Although not codified in a comprehensive fashion, the ideas contained in this paragraph are a conglomeration of recommendations made during the USSCOM 2010 Global Scout Limited Objective Experiment #1 conducted 27–29 April 2010 at USSOCOM Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. The author of this work had the opportunity to participate in the experiment and he credits retired Colonels Joseph Celeski and Grey Welborn for their impact on the ideas presented in this thesis.

ADC: Gentlemen, I think we have just completed all of our tasks. Let me send a final update to the DCO about our recommendations and then we will be finished with this working group!

> **To: DCO, USASOC**
> **From: Aide-de-Camp**
> **Subject: PME Working Group #3**
>
> Sir,
> Please review the working group's recommended career-long education-utilization model along with suggestions regarding implementation of the model.
>
> V/R
> ADC

Figure 11.   ARSOF Career-Long Education-Utilization Model

Model Implementation Course of Action 1

Create ARSOF University to implement and manage the education-utilization model separate and distinct from the GPF leader development model.

PROS
- Provides ARSOF senior leaders flexibility to use emerging strategic contexts and competency requirements to shape a career-long educational strategy
- Provides normalizing SOF-centric education to all qualification course graduates as a group before initial utilization assignments
- Provides branch and MOS-specific education via tailored coursework to support current demands and emerging trends
- Establishes academic departments to teach all the aspects of special operations

CONS
- Monumental undertaking
- Creates irreversible ARSOF-GPF schism

Figure 12.   Education-Utilization Model, Implementation Course of Action #1

Model Implementation Course of Action 2

Recommend Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) implement and manage the education-utilization model for the entire USSOCOM community.

PROS
• Establishes a SOF knowledge center to create and teach joint doctrine all under the auspices of a single four-star headquarters
• Synergizes SOF efforts into a single command, while allowing each Service Component to maintain a degree of autonomy via mandatory course requirements

CONS
• Cost of JSOU transforming itself into a university organized into two mutually supporting subsidiaries
• Risk of SOF doctrine and capabilities becoming too centralized

Figure 13.   Education-Utilization Model, Implementation Course of Action #2

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